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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 4 MBFR VIENNA 0060

MBFR NEGOTIATIONS

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJ: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: FEB 19 EASTERN PLENARY STATEMENT

REF: MBFR VIENNA 0054 DTG 181342Z FEB 76, MBFR VIENNA 0051

DTG 171912Z FEB 76

1. SUMMARY. AT THE FEB 19 PLENARY MEETING OF THE VIENNA FORCE REDUCTIONS NEGOTIATIONS, SOVIET REP (KHLESTOV) FORMALLY PRESENTED THE NEW EASTERN REDUCTION PROPOSAL (PARAS 21 THROUGH 25 BELOW), THE DETAILS OF WHICH ORIGINALLY WERE GIVEN TO WESTERN REPS AT THE FEB 17 INFORMAL SESSION (SEE REFTELS). IN EXPLAINING THE NEW PROPOSAL, KHLESTOV CLAIMED IT MET A NUMBER OF WESTERN CONCERNS. FOR EXAMPLE, HE SAID, SOVIET AND US FORCES ONLY WOULD REDUCE IN A 1976 FIRST STAGE -- BY 2 TO 3 PERCENT OF THE RESPECTIVE WARSAW PACT AND NATO TOTALS IN CENTRAL EUROPE --

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WITH REDUCTIONS BY OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANTS DEFERRED UNTIL

A SECOND STAGE IN 1977/78. MOREOVER, THE EAST WOULD INITIALLY ACCEPT A GENERAL COMMITMENT FROM THE NON-US DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO REDUCE IN THE SECOND STAGE BY THE SAME PERCENTAGE AS THAT USED BY ALL DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN COMPUTING THEIR REDUCTIONS, WITH THE DETAILS OF SUCH REDUCTIONS TO BE WORKED OUT IN SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS. IN ADDITION, ALL FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE BESIDES THOSE OF THE USSR AND US WOULD BE FROZEN AT THEIR PRESENT LEVELS UNTIL THEIR REDUCTION IN THE SECOND STAGE. BEFORE PRESENTING THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL, KHLESTOV CRITICIZED THE WESTERN NUCLEAR OFFER OF DEC 16 ON A NUMBER OF FAMILIAR GROUNDS AND CLAIMED THAT THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH STILL FAILED TO PROVIDE A BASIS FOR ACHIEVING THE AGREED GOALS OF THE VIENNA TALKS OR OF MAKING PROGRESS IN THEM. SOVIET REP CONCLUDED HIS STATEMENT WITH THE HOPE THAT WESTERN GOVERNMENTS WOULD STUDY THE NEW EASTERN PROPOSAL IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND RESPOND POSITIVELY TO IT. END SUMMARY.

2. AN INFORMAL TRANSLATION OF THE ORIGINAL RUSSIAN-LANGUAGE TEXT FOLLOWS: BEGIN TEXT
RESPECTED COMRADE CHAIRMAN, RESPECTED COLLEAGUES,

1. FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS IN VIENNA, THAT IS ALREADY FOR MORE THAN TWO YEARS THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE BEEN PATIENTLY AND PERSISTENTLY TRYING TO OBTAIN A SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM OF THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE INTERESTS OF STRENGTHENING PEACE AND SECURITY IN THIS AREA.

2. IN AN EFFORT AT ONCE TO GIVE THE NEGOTIATIONS A BUSINESSLIKE AND CONSTRUCTIVE CHARACTER, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, POLAND, THE USSR AND CZECHOSLOVAKIA TABLED THEIR DRAFT AGREEMENT AS EARLY AS THE 8TH NOV 1973. THE COMPREHENSIVE AND SPECIFIC PROGRAMME FOR THE REDUCTION OF FORCES CONTAINED IN IT CREATED THE POSSIBILITY OF ACHIEVING AN AGREEMENT WHOSE REALISATION WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER THE PRESENT HIGH LEVEL OF MILITARY CONFRONTATION IN THE CENTRE OF THE CONTINENT OF EUROPE AND WOULD THEREBY STRENGTHEN BOTH ALL-EUROPEAN SECURITY AS A WHOLE AND ALSO THE SECURITY OF EACH STATE INDIVIDUALLY. THIS DOCUMENT IS THE FIRM FOUNDATION OF THE POSITION OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, IN THAT IT FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE AIM OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND CONFIDENTIAL

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IS IN STRICT CONFORMITY WITH THE PRINCIPLES AGREED AT THE PREPARATORY TALKS. THESE, AS IS WELL KNOWN, INCLUDE SUCH BASIC PRINCIPLES AS UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES, MUTUALITY OF REDUCTIONS, EQUALITY OF OBLIGATIONS ACCEPTED BY SOVEREIGN STATES, AND NOT OBTAINING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES.

3. WITH THE AIM OF FURTHERING PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE REPEATEDLY PRODUCED NEW PROPOSALS WHICH

TAKE ACCOUNT OF SUBSTANTIAL ELEMENTS OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. THEY AGREED THAT THE USSR AND THE USA SHOULD REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES FIRST IN 1975, AND THEREAFTER ALSO IN 1976; THEY PROPOSED THAT AN INITIAL FORCE REDUCTION STEP BE IMPLEMENTED; THEY EXPRESSED THEMSELVES IN FAVOUR OF ALL DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING STATES UNDERTAKING AN OBLIGATION NOT TO INCREASE THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE NEGOTIATIONS.

4. ALL THESE PROPOSALS ARE WELL KNOWN TO OUR PARTNERS AND CONTINUE TO BE ON THE NEGOTIATING TABLE, RETAINING THEIR RELEVANCE IN FULL MEASURE.

5. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE NATO COUNTRIES HAVE NOT, HOWEVER, SHOWN THE NECESSARY CONSTRUCTIVENESS AND REALISM IN THEIR APPROACH TO OUR PROPOSALS. MOREOVER, THEY HAVE PUT FORWARD A PLAN OF REDUCTIONS WHOSE IMPLEMENTATION, AS THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE REPEATEDLY SHOWN, WOULD GIVE THE MEMBERS OF NATO EVIDENT MILITARY ADVANTAGES AT THE EXPENSE OF THE SECURITY OF THE MEMBER STATES OF THE WARSAW PACT.

6. THE SUBSTANCE OF THE POSITION OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS, UNFORTUNATELY, DID NOT CHANGE EVEN AFTER THEY HAD TABLED THEIR PROPOSAL OF 16 DEC 1975. THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALREADY EXPLAINED IN WHAT LIES THE UNACCEPTABLE CHARACTER OF THIS PROPOSAL, UNDER WHICH THE READINESS OF THE WEST TO AGREE TO THE REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN PART OF THE AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS MADE DIRECTLY DEPENDENT ON THE ACCEPTANCE BY THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES OF THE WESTERN PLAN OF REDUCTIONS AS A WHOLE.

7. DID THE PROPOSAL OF 16 DEC 1975 REALLY GIVE US AN ANSWER TO THE QUESTION OF BY WHAT QUANTITY AND WITHIN WHAT TIME

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LIMITS THE WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES AND CANADA ARE READY TO REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS? NO. THESE WESTERN STATES CONTINUE TO REFUSE TO ASSUME CLEAR OBLIGATIONS REGARDING THE REDUCTION OF THEIR FORCES.

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8. DOES THE NEW PROPOSAL REALLY MEAN THAT THE WEST HAS AGREED TO THE INCLUSION IN REDUCTIONS OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT? NO. AIR FORCE MANPOWER IS LEFT OUT OF THE REDUCTION, AS IS THE GREATEST PART OF THE ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT WITH WHICH GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE EQUIPPED. AS THE HEAD OF THE US DELEGATION, AMBASSADOR RESOR, EXPLAINED IN HIS STATEMENT AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF 16 DEC 1976, THE WESTERN PROPOSAL "HAS A ONE-TIME CHARACTER" AND "IS NOT A STEP TOWARDS FURTHER REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR OR AIR FORCES OR IN EQUIPMENT".

9. AN OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE NATO COUNTRIES SHOWS THAT IT STILL SPEAKS OF "ASYMMETRICAL" REDUCTION OF GROUND FORCES, IE ONE THAT IS INEQUITABLE FOR THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES, WHICH MEANS THAT THEY MUST REDUCE ALMOST THREE TIMES MORE TROOPS THAN THE WESTERN COUNTRIES. WE SHOULD LIKE TO REPEAT QUITE CATEGORICALLY THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES WILL NOT AGREE TO CONFIDENTIAL

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ACCEPT THIS UNREALISTIC DEMAND. LET REDUCTIONS BE MADE JOINTLY AND ON AN EQUAL BASIS.

10. AS BEFORE, THE WESTERN STATES INSIST THAT THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ACCEPT THE CONCEPT OF "COMMON COLLECTIVE CEILINGS",

WHICH IN EFFECT SECURE THEM THE RIGHT TO INCREASE - EVEN IN COMPARISON WITH THEIR PRESENT LEVEL - THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF ONE OR ANOTHER NATO COUNTRY. WE CANNOT AGREE WITH THIS IDEA SINCE IT DIRECTLY CONTRADICTS THE SUBJECT OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH IS THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF THE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS OF ALL COUNTRIES WITH FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

11. THE WESTERN REPRESENTATIVES STATE - THE HEAD OF THE UK DELEGATION, AMB ROSE, SPOKE OF THIS AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF 12 FEBRUARY - THAT THE ONE-TIME INCLUSION IN REDUCTIONS OF A CERTAIN PART OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONRY BALANCES THE REDUCTIONS WHICH THE SOCIALIST STATES ARE TO CARRY OUT UNDER THE WESTERN PLAN. IN OTHER WORDS, WE ARE INVITED TO AGREE THAT FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW THE WITHDRAWAL FROM CENTRAL EUROPE IN A FIRST PHASE OF REDUCTIONS OF A SOVIET TANK ARMY (68,000 SERVICEMEN AND 1700 TANKS) WILL BE EQUIVALENT TO THE WITHDRAWAL OF 29,000 US SOLDIERS TAKEN SELECTIVELY FROM DIFFERENT UNITS, AND THE REDUCTION OF A CERTAIN QUANTITY OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

12. PERMIT ME TO EXPRESS THE FOLLOWING VIEWS IN CONNECTION WITH THIS ASSERTION.

13. THE SOCIALIST STATES HAVE FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS DECLARED THEIR WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE ON A BASIS OF EQUIVALENCE ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES, ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. WE REGARD THE WESTERN PROPOSAL OF 16 DEC 1975 AS A RECOGNITION BY THE WESTERN COUNTRIES OF THE EVIDENT FACT THAT ONE CANNOT REDUCE ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE WHILE LEAVING UNTOUCHED THE MOST TERRIBLE AND DESTRUCTIVE MEANS OF WAGING WAR - NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THEREFORE ALL STATES POSSESSING NUCLEAR WEAPONS, INCLUDING THEIR MEANS OF DELIVERY, IN CENTRAL EUROPE SHOULD REDUCE THEM.

14. WE SHOULD FURTHER LIKE TO POINT OUT THAT ONE CANNOT EITHER FROM THE MILITARY OR FROM ANY OTHER POINT OF VIEW JUSTIFY THE THESIS THAT THE REDUCTION OF ENTIRELY DIFFERENT AND INCOMPARABLE

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COMPONENTS OF THE ARMED FORCES (IN THE PRESENT CASE A SOVIET TANK ARMY AND A CERTAIN QUANTITY OF AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS) IS EQUIVALENT FROM THE MILITARY POINT OF VIEW. IT IS PERMISSIBLE TO ASK WHAT CRITERIA UNDERLIE THE WESTERN PROPOSAL? AS FAR AS WE KNOW, NO OBJECTIVE CRITERIA EXIST ON THE BASIS OF WHICH ONE CAN SAY THAT SOME QUANTITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS EQUIVALENT IN COMBAT CAPABILITY TO A SPECIFIC NUMBER OF TANKS.

15. MANY YEARS OF EXPERIENCE OF NEGOTIATIONS IN THE FIELD OF DISARMAMENT SHOW THAT EFFORTS TO WORK OUT SUCH CRITERIA FOR THE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT HAVE BEEN VAIN. IT IS NOT BY CHANCE THAT IT WAS STRESSED IN THE

REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE USA TO CONGRESS PUBLISHED IN MAY 1973, CITING MOREOVER THE RESULTS OF COMPREHENSIVE RESEARCH ON THIS PROBLEM, THAT "IT IS POSSIBLE THAT IT WOULD TURN OUT TO BE EXTREMELY COMPLICATED TO ESTABLISH EQUIVALENCE OF DIFFERENT WEAPON SYSTEMS". THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS HAVE NO BASIS FOR THEIR ASSERTION THAT THEIR PROPOSAL FOR CARRYING OUT THE SO-CALLED MUTUALLY BALANCED REDUCTION OF DIFFERENT TYPES OF ARMAMENTS IS WELL-FOUNDED AND EQUITABLE. AT THE SAME TIME IT IS QUITE EVIDENT THAT THIS PROPOSAL CONTRADICTS THE PRINCIPLES AGREED IN THE COURSE OF THE PREPARATORY TALKS AND, IN PARTICULAR, THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL PARTIES.

16. IT IS IMPOSSIBLE NOT TO DRAW THE CONCLUSION FROM WHAT I HAVE SAID THAT THE PRINCIPAL DEFICIENCIES OF THE WESTERN PLAN, WHICH IS DIRECTED AT SECURING UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES FOR THE NATO COUNTRIES, HAVE REMAINED UNCHANGED EVEN AFTER THE TABLING OF THEIR PROPOSAL OF 16 DEC 1975. THE AIM OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS IS TO WORK OUT MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE SOLUTIONS WHICH WOULD LEAD TO REAL MILITARY DETENTE IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND TO THE STRENGTHENING OF STABILITY IN THAT AREA. THE WESTERN PLAN, EVEN WITH THE ADDITION MADE TO IT, DOES NOT PERMIT THE ATTAINMENT OF THIS GOAL AND DOES NOT CREATE A BASE FROM WHICH IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO OBTAIN PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. COMRADE CHAIRMAN,

17. IN ANALYSING THE SITUATION WHICH HAS BEEN CREATED IN THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS AT THE PRESENT TIME, WE SHOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE THAT THE PROGRAMME FOR THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE PUT FORWARD BY THE SOCIALIST CONFIDENTIAL

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COUNTRIES PROVIDES THE POSSIBILITY OF WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE AGREEMENT. ONLY THE STUBBORN UNWILLINGNESS OF THE WESTERN STATES TO RENOUNCE ANY EFFORTS TO OBTAIN FOR THEMSELVES MILITARY ADVANTAGES PREVENTS US FROM OBTAINING THE PERCEPTIBLE MOVEMENT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WHICH THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE, AND INDEED OF THW WHOLE WORLD AWAIT WITH IMPATIENCE.

18. DESPITE ALL THE EXISTING DIFFICULTIES, HOWEVER, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ARE CONVINCED THAT, GIVEN GOOD WILL, THE MOST COMPLICATED INTERNATIONAL PROBLEMS, INCLUDING THAT WHICH WE ARE DISCUSSING, CAN BE SOLVED TO THE MUTUAL SATISFACTION OF THOSE PARTICIPATING. CONVINCING EVIDENCE OF THIS IS PROVIDED BY THE RESULTS OF THE HISTORIC ALL-EUROPEAN CONFERENCE WHOSE SUCCESSFUL CONCLUSION HAS CREATED MORE FAVOURABLE CONDITIONS FOR OUR WORK IN VIENNA.

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19. PROCEEDING FROM THE TASK, WHICH IS THE MOST IMPORTANT OF OUR TIMES, OF COMPLEMENTING POLITICAL DETENTE IN EUROPE WITH MEASURES IN THE FIELD OF MILITARY DETENTE, THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES INTEND TO CONTINUE NOT TO SLACKEN THEIR EFFORTS TO SECURE PROGRESS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMAMENTS AND ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. IN THE INTERESTS OF ACHIEVING THIS GOAL, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE GDR, POLAND, CZECHOSLOVAKIA AND THE USSR ARE, BY THE AUTHORITY OF THEIR GOVERNMENTS, TABLING AT TODAY'S PLENARY SESSION A NEW PROPOSAL WHOSE BASIS IS AN EFFORT TO ASSIST OUR NEGOTIATIONS TO ENTER A NEW STAGE - THE STAGE OF THE PRACTICAL WORKING OUT OF SOLUTIONS TO THE PROBLEM WHICH WE ARE DISCUSSING.

20. SPECIFICALLY, THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS PROPOSE THE FOLLOWING:

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21. IN THE FIRST STAGE - IN THE COURSE OF 1976 - THE REDUCTION IS TO BE CARRIED OUT IN CENTRAL EUROPE OF THE ARMED FORCES ONLY OF THE USSR AND THE USA BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE (APPROXIMATELY 2-3 PERCENT) OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE COUNTRIES OF THE WARSAW PACT AND OF NATO IN THIS AREA.

22. IN THIS REGARD A SPECIFIC REDUCTION IS ENVISAGED ON EACH SIDE OF 300 TANKS - 2-3 TANK REGIMENTS, 2-3 BRIGADES; 54 NUCLEAR-CAPABLE AIRCRAFT (SOVIET "FITTER" AND AMERICAN "F-4") AND ALSO AN EQUAL NUMBER OF OPERATIONAL-TACTICAL MISSILE LAUNCHERS (SOVIET "SCUD-B" AND AMERICAN "PERSHING") TOGETHER WITH A DEFINITE NUMBER OF NUCLEAR WARHEADS FOR THESE DELIVERY SYSTEMS; 36 AIR DEFENCE GUIDED MISSILE LAUNCHERS (SOVIET "SAM-2" AND AMERICAN "NIKE HERCULES", "HAWK"); ONE ARMY CORPS HEADQUARTERS WITH COMBAT SUPPORT AND SERVICE UNITS.

23. WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN AGREEMENT ON THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES, ALL OTHER STATES HAVING FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE ARE TO ASSUME CLEARLY FORMULATED OBLIGATIONS TO "FREEZE" AT THE PRESENT LEVEL THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND TO REDUCE THESE FORCES IN THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE (1977-1978) SO THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTIONS IN BOTH STAGES ALL STATES PARTICIPATING IN THEM WILL HAVE REDUCED THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE.

24. THE REDUCTION OF FORCES IS TO BE EFFECTED BY ENTIRE MILITARY SUB-UNITS, UNITS AND OTHER FORMATIONS TOGETHER WITH THE CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, AND NOT BY INDIVIDUAL SERVICEMEN TAKEN FROM DIFFERENT UNITS.

25. THE REDUCED SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES ARE TO BE WITHDRAWN TO THEIR OWN TERRITORY, WHERE THEY ARE TO BE DISBANDED.

26. WE WOULD LIKE TO EMPHASISE THAT THIS PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES FULLY CORRESPONDS TO THE PRINCIPLES AGREED UPON IN THE PREPARATORY CONSULTATIONS AND AT THE SAME TIME CONTAINS ELEMENTS WHICH MOVE IN THE DIRECTION OF THE DESIRES AND CONSIDERATIONS OF THE WESTERN DELEGATIONS.

27. WE HAVE THOUGHT AND CONTINUE TO THINK THAT THE MOST
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EFFECTIVE AND EQUITABLE APPROACH TO THE MUTUAL REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IS THE INCLUSION IN SUCH A REDUCTION FROM THE VERY BEGINNING OF THE FORCES OF ALL COUNTRIES WHICH ARE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. HOWEVER, TAKING ACCOUNT OF THE DESIRE OF OUR WESTERN PARTNERS, WE HAVE AGREED THAT IN EACH OF THE FIRST TWO STAGES, THAT IS IN 1975 AND 1976

SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED IN THE FIRST HALF YEAR AND ONLY AFTER THIS, IN THE SECOND HALF YEAR, THE ARMED FORCES OF THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES.

28. NOW IT IS PROPOSED TO TAKE A NEW STEP IN THIS DIRECTION AND TO ENVISAGE THAT IN THE FIRST STAGE (IN 1976) THE ARMED FORCES OF THE USSR AND THE USA ONLY SHOULD BE REDUCED. THE OTHER STATES HAVING FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE WOULD CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS OF THEIR FORCES IN THE SECOND STAGE (IN 1977-1978).

29. WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT STILL ANOTHER DESIRE OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES; WHEREAS FORMERLY WE ADVOCATED THAT CONCRETE OBLIGATIONS WORKED OUT IN DETAIL SHOULD BE FIXED FROM THE VERY BEGINNING FOR ALL THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS, IT IS NOW PROPOSED TO SET FORTH IN DETAIL IN THE AGREEMENT ON FIRST STAGE REDUCTION THE OBLIGATIONS ONLY OF THE USSR AND THE USA.

30. SIMILAR DETAILED OBLIGATIONS OF THE OTHER DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES WILL BE WORKED OUT IN THE COURSE OF THE SUBSEQUENT NEGOTIATIONS FOR THE PRESENT THESE COUNTRIES WOULD LIMIT THEMSELVES TO UNDERTAKING OBLIGATIONS OF A GENERAL CHARACTER, THAT IS TO "FREEZE" THEIR ARMED FORCES AT THE PRESENT LEVEL OF NUMERICAL STRENGTH AND TO REDUCE THEM IN THE SUBSEQUENT STAGE (IN 1977-78) SO THAT AS A RESULT OF THE REDUCTION IN BOTH STAGES ALL THE COUNTRIES WHICH PARTICIPATED IN IT WILL HAVE REDUCED THEIR ARMED FORCES BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE.

31. THUS WE HAVE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT ONE OF THE BASIC ELEMENTS OF THE WESTERN POSITION, NAMELY THAT THE USSR AND THE USA WILL REDUCE THEIR ARMED FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE IN THE FIRST STAGE AND THAT THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANT COUNTRIES WILL CARRY OUT REDUCTIONS IN THE SECOND STAGE. AT THE SAME TIME AS A RESULT OF THE APPLICATION OF THE METHOD OF REDUCTION WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED THE EQUIVALENCE OF THE OBLIGATIONS ASSUMED BY SOVEREIGN
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STATES AND THE STRICTLY MUTUAL CHARACTER OF THE REDUCTION WILL BE ASSURED.

32. IN THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES IT IS ENVISAGED THAT, APART FROM THE USSR AND THE USA, THE REMAINING DIRECT PARTICIPANT STATES WILL "FREEZE" THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THEIR ARMED FORCES DURING THE PERIOD OF THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND AMERICAN FORCES. HERE ALSO ACCOUNT IS TAKEN OF ONE OF THE WELL KNOWN ELEMENTS OF THE WEST'S POSITION. WE ARE IN FAVOUR OF A "FREEZE" OF A KIND WHICH WOULD EFFECTIVELY PREVENT AN INCREASE IN THE NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE STATES WHICH HAVE FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE.

33. IN OUR VIEW THE DETERMINATION OF THE PARTICIPANTS IN THE NEGOTIATIONS NOT TO PERMIT ACTIONS WHICH WOULD BE CONTRARY TO THE PURPOSES OF THE NEGOTIATIONS HAS GREAT SIGNIFICANCE FOR THE STRENGTHENING OF CONFIDENCE AMONG THEM AND IN THE FINAL RESULT FOR THE SUCCESSFUL RESOLUTION OF THE PROBLEMS WE ARE DISCUSSING. THE ADOPTION OF THIS MEASURE WOULD DEMONSTRATE THE POLITICAL WILL OF THE STATES TO SET LIMITS TO THE FURTHER INCREASE OF MILITARY POTENTIAL IN CENTRAL EUROPE AND WOULD ELIMINATE THE POSSIBILITY OF SPECULATING IN IN THE DISCUSSIONS ABOUT THE GROWTH OF ANY KIND OF "THREAT" TO THE SECURITY OF THE STATES.

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34. A VIRTURE OF OUR PROPOSAL IS ALSO THAT IT ENVISAGES THE REDUCTION OF ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES - GROUND FORCES AND AIR FORCES. THIS MEANS MANPOWER AS WELL AS ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

35. IN CONTRADISTINCTION TO THE WEST WE PROPOSE THAT THE

NUCLEAR WEAPONS NOT ONLY OF THE USA BUT ALSO OF THE SOVIET UNION BE REDUCED. THE SOCIALIST STATES PROCEED IN THIS CONNECTION FROM THEIR PRINCIPLED POSITION WHICH IS THAT MILITARY RELAXATION IN CENTRAL EUROPE WILL NOT BE ACHIEVED IF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, WHICH ARE THE MOST DANGEROUS MEANS OF WAGING WAR - ESPECIALLY ON THE THICKLY POPULATED EUROPEAN CONTINENT - ARE EXCLUDED FROM THE REDUCTION. THE NECESSITY OF THE INCLUSION IN THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IS A GENERALLY RECOGNISED AND UNIVERSAL REQUIREMENT.

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36. THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS SHOULD NOT HAVE THE CHARACTER OF A LIMITED ONE-TIME ACTION AS THE WESTERN COUNTRIES PROPOSE. WE ADVOCATE THAT ALL NUCLEAR COMPONENTS BE REDUCED IN BOTH STAGES, THAT IS IN THE COURSE OF 1976 AND 1977-1978, BY ALL STATES POSSESSING THESE COMPONENTS. A SITUATION CANNOT BE PERMITTED IN WHICH SOME ONE OF THE STATES POSSESSING, LET US SUPPOSE, THE MEANS OF DELIVERY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS, SHOULD PRESERVE FOR ITSELF THE FREEDOM TO INCREASE THESE MEANS AT THE VERY TIME WHEN OTHER PARTICIPANTS IN THE AGREEMENT ARE REDUCING THEM.

37. IN CONFORMITY WITH THE BASIC PRINCIPLE OF THE VIENNA NEGOTIATIONS-UNDIMINISHED SECURITY FOR ALL STATES-THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES PROPOSE THAT THE REDUCTION OF SOVIET AND US FORCES BE CARRIED OUT IN THE FIRST STAGE BY AN EQUAL PERCENTAGE: THE US FORCES-OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE NATO STATES, AND THE SOVIET FORCES-OF THE OVERALL NUMERICAL STRENGTH OF THE ARMED FORCES OF THE WARSAW PACT FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THEREBY THE EQUITY OF THE REDUCTIONS IS ASSURED AND THE POSSIBILITY OF CHANGING THE PRESENT OVERALL FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN CENTRAL EUROPE IS PREVENTED, WHICH IS ESSENTIAL, AS IS NOW ADMITTED ALSO BY THE REPRESENTATIVES OF THE WESTERN COUNTRIES.

38. UNDER THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST STATES, REDUCTIONS ARE TO BE IMPLEMENTED BY ENTIRE MILITARY SUB-UNITS, UNITS AND OTHER FORMATIONS TOGETHER WITH THE CORRESPONDING ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT. ONLY IN SUCH A WAY CAN ONE ENSURE THE EFFECTIVE SOLUTION OF THE TASK OF LESSENING THE HIGH CONCENTRATION OF FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE. THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN SERVICEMEN TAKEN SELECTIVELY FROM DIFFERENT UNITS DOES NOT SIGNIFY A REAL REDUCTION IN THE FORCES OF THE USA AND, AS WE CAN UNDERSTAND FROM CERTAIN WESTERN STATEMENTS AND PRESS REPORTS, IS MORE CONNECTED WITH MEASURES FOR THE REORGANISATION OF US FORCES IN CENTRAL EUROPE THAN WITH THE AIMS OF OUR NEGOTIATIONS.

39. WE SHOULD ALSO LIKE TO DRAW THE ATTENTION OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS

TO YET ANOTHER IMPORTANT ASPECT OF THE PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES. WE ENVISAGE THAT THE REDUCED FOREIGN FORCES SHOULD NOT ONLY BE WITHDRAWN TO WITHIN THEIR NATIONAL FRONTIERS, BUT
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SHOULD ALSO BE DISBANDED THERE. THIS STEP MEETS THE WISHES OF THE SO-CALLED "FLANK" STATES, TO THE ENSURING OF WHOSE SECURITY INTERESTS THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES HAVE ALWAYS SHOWN GREAT ATTENTION. AT THE SAME TIME IT REPRESENTS AN ADDITIONAL CONTRIBUTION TO THE CAUSE OF DISARMAMENT, WHICH, WITHOUT DOUBT, MEETS WITH THE ASPIRATIONS OF THE PEOPLES OF EUROPE.

40. THUS THE NEW PROPOSAL OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES ENVISAGES SPECIFIC AND EQUIVALENT OBLIGATIONS BY ALL STATES DIRECTLY PARTICIPATING IN THE NEGOTIATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE REDUCTION ON A MUTUAL BASIS OF THEIR ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS. THIS REDUCTION EXTENDS TO ALL TYPES OF ARMED FORCES AND INCLUDES BOTH MANPOWER AND ARMAMENTS AND COMBAT EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. ITS REALISATION GIVES NO UNILATERAL MILITARY ADVANTAGES OF ANY KIND TO ANYBODY AND WILL NOT DIMINISH THE SECURITY OF ANY STATE. IT WILL FURTHER THE CREATION OF MORE STABLE RELATIONS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF PEACE AND SECURITY IN EUROPE.

41. THE DELEGATIONS OF THE SOCIALIST COUNTRIES CONSIDER THAT THEIR NEW PROPOSAL ALLOWS US TO SET ABOUT WORKING OUT A MUTUALLY ACCEPTABLE UNDERSTANDING ON THE REDUCTION OF ARMED FORCES AND ARMAMENTS IN CENTRAL EUROPE. WE HOPE THAT THE WESTERN STATES WILL EXAMINE THIS PROPOSAL IN A CONSTRUCTIVE SPIRIT AND GIVE A POSITIVE RESPONSE TO IT. END TEXT.RESOR

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